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Evaluation of the impact of urban water systems on 
railways: the scenario of track flooding caused by a water 
main burst 
Samane Faramehr, Hassan Hemida, Taku Fujiyama 
Abstract 
Failures and disruption scenarios can reveal inherent but little known dependencies that exist 
between technical infrastructure systems. Whereas the dependencies between infrastructures 
in their normal state of operation are usually obvious and mutually correlated, 
interdependencies when systems are disrupted show a great deal of variety, depending on the 
specific scenario. The literature reveals the lack of a proper tool that can evaluate and quantify 
the scenario of track flooding caused by a water main burst, a cross-sectoral failure that can 
impact the operation of two urban infrastructure systems: the railways and the water supply.  
This work presents an approach to investigate the impact of urban water systems on railways 
and applies it to the case study of the Thameslink railway and Thames Water assets in London. 
The developed tool can be integrated into city level water supply GIS systems to facilitate the 
understanding of external risks (transport disruption) caused by an internal failure (water main 
bursts). Also the results can help railway system operators facilitate the decision making 
process in terms of drainage policy and maintenance activities.  
Introduction  
Critical technical infrastructures, sometimes referred to as large-scale spatially distributed 
systems, with high degrees of complexity provide essential services for the society. Different 
infrastructures (i.e., energy, transport, water, waste and information and communication 
technology) have developed over centuries, being planned and implemented individually. 
These systems are mostly managed in isolation from one another, ignoring the dependencies, 
linkages and feedback from other infrastructures [1]. However, infrastructure systems are 
actually highly interconnected and interdependent and hence what happens to one system can 
directly or indirectly affect other systems. Infrastructures interact in complex ways through 
direct connectivity, strategies and functions or spatial proximities [2]. Dependencies need to 
be understood properly for the normal state of operation of systems as well as for their 
vulnerabilities. Disturbances in one infrastructure can cross over to other dependent 
infrastructures and possibly can return to the infrastructure where the disturbances originated. 
Potential cascading effects and risk analysis in interdependent infrastructures has been the 
subject of many studies (e.g. [3], [4], [5], [6] and [7]) in different geographic and time scales. 
Indeed, the silo approach of managing infrastructures within traditional boundaries of one 
infrastructure system and ignoring collaboration with other infrastructure operators fails to 
consider such cross-sectoral risk scenarios.  
In many cases interdependent risks at a technical level have been neglected and hence not well 
investigated due to one (or all) of the following challenges: 
• Infrastructure Sectors have different identification and prioritizations of risks according 
to their particular goals and hence stakeholders have different concerns. 
• Relevant asset data are lost or insufficient (especially in highly complex systems) 
• The impacts on one (or more) of the systems may be indirect (e.g. the operation of the 
systems itself is not disturbed). Additionally, although the scenario can have a 
significant impact (consequence) on systems, its likelihood is usually low. 
• The origin and the flow of failures within interdependent infrastructures may not be 
visible or reported. 
A prime example of such a risk at operation level is the scenario of track flooding in a city. A 
burst in a major water main adjacent to a railway track can cause flooding that disturbs the 
operation of both of the technical infrastructures (the railways and the water supply systems). 
The consequences of such incidents can vary from a few minutes to days of train delays, 
interruption to water supplies, and financial and social losses for the railway and water supply 
companies. In urban areas, in addition to pluvial and fluvial flooding, two other types of flood 
hazard sources have been recognised: burst water mains and direct connections (sewers). The 
limited infiltration and drainage capacity in urban areas and the highly complex interaction of 
infrastructure systems (utilities, water supply, transport etc.) together with the population 
density represent a genuine challenge. Floods pose a considerable risk to the assets and the 
operation of technical infrastructures. The railways assets and especially track and trackside 
assets are liable to be disrupted by undrained water in flood-prone areas such as at the foot of 
cuttings and natural slopes, over and under bridges and inside tunnels. The behaviour of the 
flood may vary depending on the source(s) of flooding and the physical attributes of the flooded 
premise(s) (e.g. railway track, road, underground tunnels and basements) in urban areas.  
On the other hand, while an urban railway system transports passengers according to a time 
table, an urban water system is responsible for both a consistent water supply to public and 
waste water management. In a normal operating condition it is expected that none of the 
systems will disrupt the others. However, in the case of risk scenarios, such as track flooding 
caused by a water main burst, the operation of both systems may be disrupted. Although 
flooding is considered as a risk for the both geographically proximate systems, its impact on 
the operation of a railways is more direct. This is due to the fact that the water supply system 
may still be able to provide water to customers (and hence meet the system’s purpose) while 
the flooded railway system cannot operate normally before the necessary handling has been 
implemented. Furthermore, flood risk considerations usually ignore a burst water main as a 
flood source. This is because burst water mains are very difficult to predict and generally occur 
randomly, most likely as a result of infrastructure failure. Although burst water mains in 
general have been investigated before ([8] and [9]), the particular consequences of flooding 
caused by a burst for a railway system have been largely ignored in academic literature. London 
Underground developed a GIS-based flood risk analysis to include all sources of urban flooding 
(including connections and mains) [10]. The risk analysis found that of all flood sources, water 
main bursts contribute to the highest flood risk for Transport for London (TfL) assets. 
This research has developed a tool that can evaluate the scenario of track flooding caused by a 
water main burst and quantify the dependency of the operation of a railway system on such 
flooding. The model and results can aid the prioritisation of investments and risks as well as 
enable the optimisation of maintenance activities for both railways and water companies by 
providing a quantified measure of a dependency scenario.   
Note that this study aimed neither at understanding the underlying factors of trunk main failure 
nor its likelihood and risk. Rather it aimed at understanding the impacts such bursts have on 
railways infrastructure and operation. As the term “interdependency” indicates, linkages and 
impacts between infrastructures may be bidirectional [1]. Therefore, the scenarios of the 
disruption of a water supply system caused by railway operation and maintenance also require 
attention. Examples of this include the deterioration and damage of water assets due to 
maintenance activities such as track tamping or stray current from tracks of electrified railway 
lines. However, because there need to be different methods for investigation of such impacts 
of railway systems on water systems, this study focuses only on the direct impacts of main 
burst induced flooding on railways operation.   
Understanding the dependency scenario 
In the first place, it is necessary to understand the dependency scenario under consideration so 
that a suitable tool can be developed. This study used stakeholder engagement to realize the 
scenario of track flooding caused by a water main burst and its importance for infrastructure 
managers. Subsequently, it carried out a case study to investigate a real world example and 
developed a generic tool using hydraulic analysis and numerical simulation. 
Thames Water Utilities Limited (TWUL) is responsible for supplying clean water and treating 
waste water in Greater London and the South of England. TWUL manages approximately 
30,000 km of water mains, of which 17,000 km are trunk mains [8]. Trunk mains are large 
pipes (18” diameter or larger) which carry a significant volume of water at high pressure. 
Towards the end of 2016 Thames Water suffered eight separate bursts on their trunk main 
network. These caused significant damage to infrastructures and businesses and temporary 
losses of water supply [11]. Regarding bursts adjacent to railways, in January 2015 water from 
a burst water main stayed on the track around Farringdon (Thameslink) and led to track 
flooding, which stopped all train operation for 2 days [12]. London Underground experienced 
a similar incident in June 2012, in which water from a burst water main went into the Central 
Line’s tunnel and stopped the line for 2 days [13]. 
Generally, if track flooding occurs, drivers must report any floodwater with the potential to 
affect the passage of trains to the signaller, who in turn must report it immediately to operations 
control. As soon as the flooding source is detected and it is reported to the water supply 
company, a decision needs to be made to stop the water supply. Because the size of the trunk 
mains are large and the water runs under high pressure, the flow may not stop until up to 3-5 
hours after switching off the supply.  
Network Rail is the owner and manager of most of the railways infrastructure in England, 
Scotland and Wales that is also responsible for maintaining more than 20,000 miles of track 
including Thameslink railway, a mainline route running through London. When the railway 
track is located lower than the surrounding area (e.g. in cuttings and tunnels) it is prone to 
flooding. Flooding is specific in urban areas in the fact that there is a lack of sufficient drainage 
in cities. In London, the railway drainage is directly connected to public sewer which represents 
a unique challenge. The railway rule book sets out standard procedures for the operation of 
trains through flood water: 
1. If the water depth is above sleeper level, but below the bottom of the railhead, 
then trains can proceed at line speed. 
2. If the water depth is above the bottom of the railhead, but below the top of the 
railhead, trains may proceed at 5 mph. 
3. If the water depth is above the top of the railhead, trains may only proceed if 
given express permission to do so by Operations [14] 
Major London railway infrastructure operators, Network Rail and London Underground, as 
well as the water supply company TWUL agree that it is necessary to develop tools for better 
understanding of the shared risk of urban flooding. This requires improvement in 
communication, asset information and quantified analyses of risks.  
In order to evaluate the disruption scenario, data and information were collected from relevant 
stakeholders for the case study area. The data includes; GIS data of trunk mains, track features 
(e.g. tunnels and bridges), signalling equipment and gradient of railway line in the case study 
area. Additionally, policies on the operation of vehicles through floodwater [14] and the general 
railways standards regarding the track and drainage [15] were used.  Furthermore, further data 
(e.g. water pressure in trunk mains, the duration of flooding, etc.) was collected in workshops 
and interviews because the values of such parameters were not available publicly.  
Numerical simulation using MATLAB has been carried out in order to model the movement 
of water from the burst onto the track. The track area has been discretized into elements through 
which flood water flows in and flows out. The number of cells varies based on the scenarios in 
which the distance between the flood source and flood water accumulation point varies in order 
to optimize the fidelity and resolution of results. The point which flood water moves towards 
and at which it accumulates along the railway line is called “the lowest point”. The topographic 
map of London [16] shows a rise in elevation from central London towards the North West 
where the railway line extends. Therefore, in general it is true to assume that in a case of 
flooding the water movement tends to be in the direction of the lower elevation (e.g. towards 
Moorgate in central London). However, to be more specific, the longitudinal elevation of the 
track is not constant for the entire line and hence the tool considers different angels of 
inclination along the flooded track. In order to limit the scope of the work the transverse 
elevation of the track has not been considered for the study. Because, only the mains located 
in close proximity to the railway are considered for the modelling, it is assumed that the effect 
of the transverse elevation would be negligible for the water movement. The case study focuses 
on sections of Thameslink (North of Farringdon) and Midland Main Line within London where 
railway track is surrounded by trunk mains with sizes between 18” and 102”. 
Based on equation (1), the water discharge from the burst depends mainly on the area of the 
orifice and the pressure difference, which are both assumed to the equal in all trunk mains in 
the network [17].  
𝑄𝑄 = 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜�2∆𝑃𝑃𝜌𝜌           (1) 
Here, Cf is the coefficient of discharge, Ao is the area of the orifice, ∆P is pressure drop and 
ρ is fluid density. 
There is no information available about the area/size of the bursts. Therefore, for the mains in 
the area (diameter between 18” and 102”) the orifices in the pipes were assumed to be circular 
with a maximum of 0.15 m in diameter. Based on TWUL, the pressure drop almost equals 
215600Pa and 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 (the coefficient of discharge) is assumed to have a maximum of 0.9. Thus, a 
reasonable range of burst discharge (between 0𝑚𝑚3/s and 0.2 𝑚𝑚3/s) is assumed for the analysis. 
This discharge has been assumed as the initial discharge onto the sloped track over and through 
which the water moves towards the lowest point. The hydraulic calculation of the flow down 
the slope was based on the Manning equation (2), which is used for the calculation of flow 
variables (including the depth/height of water at the lowest point and flow velocity) and it 
includes the slope of the open channel (gradient of the track in this case) as a variable. As a 
broad assumption, the flood flow was considered as steady uniform flow in an open channel 
running for 3 hours. Although in many cases the orifice size will be much smaller and the burst 
running time will be shorter, the broad assumptions represent a worst case scenario for this 
analysis. 
𝑄𝑄
𝐴𝐴
= 𝑈𝑈 = 1
𝑛𝑛
𝑅𝑅2/3𝑆𝑆1/2    (2) 
Here, A(m2) is the area of the open channel, n is the Gauckler–Manning coefficient, R (m) is 
the hydraulic radium and S is the slope of the open channel [17].  
The ballast has been taken as a porous medium through which the flow passes cell by cell and 
is absorbed by sublayers. The local drainage systems, about which no asset data was available, 
have been taken as either present or absent (representing blocked drainages). Furthermore, 
ignoring the signalling assets required for railway control and operation, according to the rule 
book [14], the flooding criteria for track mainly depends on the rail profile. Eventually, 
regarding the flooding criteria, four values of water depth or H were assumed as H=0 (the 
beginning of the flooding), H=0.1 m (the water depth is above sleeper level, but below the 
bottom of the railhead), H=0.15 m   (the water depth is above the bottom of the railhead but 
below the top of the railhead) and H=0.25 m (the water depth is above the top of the railhead). 
The values are based on the standard British Steel flat rail profiles [18]. 
It is important to acknowledge that in some cases, the responses of companies to disruptions 
may deviate from the actual contingency plan due to conflicts of interest. For instance, although 
flooding is considered as a risk for both (and eventually all) geographically proximate systems, 
its impact on the operation of railway system is more direct. This is due the fact that the water 
supply system may still be able to provide water for customers (and hence meet the system’s 
purpose) after a burst while, the flooded railway system cannot operate normally. To stop the 
water running out of the burst, the water supply (for customers) needs to be stopped within the 
premises of the incident and this may be considered a larger risk for the water company than 
flooding a proximate infrastructure (in this case railways). However, from the viewpoint of a 
railway infrastructure manager, the leakage must stop as quickly as possible, hence their 
customers (train operating companies) can run the trains. Therefore, from a modelling 
perspective parameters such as time of flow running in the premises of the track may be 
adjusted accordingly. This indicates that the concerns and motivations of relevant stakeholders 
need to be captured for developing modelling and simulation tools which facilitate 
investigating little known dependency scenarios. 
Validation of the numerical model 
To validate the developed numerical model, we have conducted a small scale experiment which 
used a mobile bed model tank. The measurements in the experiment were compared to the 
outputs of the developed model run for the same conditions. The dimensions of the bed are 
600mm width and 2000m length. The device was flat simulating a zero or a very small gradient. 
These settings were chosen due to the dimensions of the bed. Two types of granular material 
were used, namely sand and gravel, to collect the results. The permeability (porosity) of both 
granular materials was measured before setting up the scaled track bed and running the test. 
Table 1 shows the variables and their values in the experiment.  
Table 1 Variables in the track flooding experiment 
Variable Value in the 
experiment 
Description 
L Sand: 2m  
Gravel: 2m 
The length of the mobile bed simulating the distance between the 
burst and the lowest point 
b Sand: 0.6m 
Gravel: 0.6m 
The width of the mobile bed simulating the width of the track 
d Sand: 0.078m 
Gravel: 0.03m 
The depth of granular material on the bed 
Q Sand: 0.00256 𝑚𝑚
3
𝑠𝑠
 
Gravel: 0.000671𝑚𝑚
3
𝑠𝑠
 
The steady flow of the water from the tank moving along the bed 
∅ Sand: 0.35 
Gravel: 0.44 
The porosity of the granular material simulating the ballast 
porosity 
S Sand: 0.001 
Gravel: 0.001 
The gradient of the bed simulating a flat gradient  
n Sand: 0.015 
Gravel: 0.025 
Manning coefficient  
 
Next, the experiment was run to collect the results for both sand and gravel using two different 
flows of 0.00256 𝑚𝑚
3
𝑠𝑠
 (for sand) and 0.000671𝑚𝑚
3
𝑠𝑠
 (for gravel) (Figure 1 and Figure 2). The steady 
flow continued until the water reached the end of the granular bed and the depth of the flow 
became constant along the bed (Figure 3 and Figure 4).  
 
Figure 1 Water movement along the sand bed 
 Figure 2 Water movement along the gravel bed 
 
 
Figure 3 Water accumulated on top of the sand bed 
 Figure 4 Water accumulated on top of the gravel bed 
The main collected data included; the distance of the front of the water from the source (“x” in 
metres) and the time it takes for the front of the flow to travel the distance (“t” in seconds) as 
well as the depth/height of the collected water above the granular bed (“h” in metres) which 
are the main parameters representing the flow behaviour. Table 2 compares the two sets of 
output data from the experiment and the numerical model. As the two sets of results closely 
match (considering experimental uncertainties), the developed numerical model is validated 
and could be used for simulation of flooding on railway tracks.   
Table 2 Comparison of the output from laboratory experiment and developed numerical model 
Output Value from the experiment Value from the developed 
numerical model 
Time (t)  Sand: 15 s 
Gravel: 25 s 
Sand: 14.9 ± 0.5 s 
Gravel: 24.7 ± 0.5 s 
Steady depth/height of 
water (h)  
Sand: 0.025 m 
Gravel: 0.015 m 
Sand: 0.024 ± 0.050 m 
Gravel: 0.014 ± 0.050  m 
 
Parametric study  
To carry out a parametric study, an appreciation of the roles of the different elements is 
required. Since the tool is generic, all values can be altered by the user on an individual burst 
by burst basis to make the result more site specific. It is necessary to define the appropriate 
metrics for investigating interdependency. The metric is supposed to relate two systems in 
connection with the same risk scenario. Also since this risk scenario has an impact on the 
operation of the railway the metric is required to reflect that impact. Therefore, considering the 
standard procedures for the operation of trains through flood water and the discharge from a 
burst, “time for track flooding” has been chosen as the dependency metric. This metric 
indicates the time length for water from a burst to flood a track.  
Figure 5 indicates that when water flows 0.055 𝑚𝑚3/s from a burst in a trunk main adjacent to a 
railway track, it takes 53 minutes for the water to accumulate above the top of the railhead 
(H=0.25 m) at the lowest point of the track. It clearly takes shorter time for the water to be 
accumulated below the top of the railhead at different depth/height (e.g. H=0 m, H=0.1 m, 
H=0.15 m and H=0.25 m).  
 
Figure 5 Time for different track flooding criteria. Here, the distance between the burst and the lowest point is 
120m, the gradient of the track is 1/33 on the flooding side and 1/333 on the other side. A drainage of 
0.002m^3⁄s capacity exists along the track at every 40m. 
Note that parameters such as; the distance between the burst and the lowest point of the track, 
the gradient of the track, as well as the ballast porosity and the drainage arrangement can 
significantly affect the time length for track flooding.  
Figure 6 shows the effect of the distance between the burst and the lowest point of the track on 
the length of time for the track to be flooded to the top of the railhead (H=0.25m). Although it 
clearly takes less time for the track to be flooded when the burst occurs nearer the lowest point, 
when the discharge is large (>0.1𝑚𝑚3/s) no significant difference is observed between the time 
lengths for track flooding. This emphasized on the effect of the size of the burst on track 
flooding (Figure 7). For orifice sizes larger than 0.1m diameter, it takes less than 15 minutes to 
flood the lowest point of a track when the distance between the burst and the lowest point varies 
between 100m and 500m. 
 
Figure 6 The effect of distance (L) between burst main and lowest point of the track on time for track flooding 
(gradients varying). For L=500m gradients at the side of the flooding are 1/89, 1/56 and 1/66.  For L=400m 
gradients at the side of the flooding are 1/56 and 1/66, and for L=200m and L=100m the gradient at the side of 
the flooding is 1/66. A drainage of 0.002m^3⁄s capacity exists along the track at every 40m. 
 
 Figure 7 Time for track flooding for different orifice size. For L=500m gradients at the side of the flooding are 
1/89, 1/56 and 1/66.  For L=400m gradients at the side of the flooding are 1/56 and 1/66, and for L=200m and 
L=100m the gradient at the side of the flooding is 1/66. A drainage of 0.002m^3⁄s capacity exists along the track 
at every 40m. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to investigate the effect of natural drainage (drainage through 
ballast) on the flooding. Ballast track, a granular material, is still the most common railway 
load bearing structure. The thickness of the ballast layer is usually 0.25-0.3m. The properties 
of new ballast including its shear strength and permeability are different from those of older 
ballast. These properties change progressively because of breakage, erosion and fouling. 
Fouling reduces the permeability of ballast layer and therefore, decreases natural drainage [19].  
The permeability of the ballast has been incorporated into the model using a “porosity” 
parameter, which is defined as the fraction of the volume of voids over the total volume of the 
ballast. It is assumed that the porosity is uniform all over the track. Figure 8 shows the effect 
of the porosity of the ballast on the time for track flooding when the distance between the burst 
and the lowest point is 120m. Obviously when the ballast is old (the porosity/ permeability is 
decreased) it takes shorter time for the track to be flooded. Again, the effect of the discharge 
(and hence of the burst size) must not be ignored. For a larger discharge little difference was 
obtained in the curves and the track may be flooded in less than an hour’s time.  
 Figure 8 Time for track flooding for different ballast porosity. The distance between the burst and the lowest 
point is 120m, the gradient of the track is 1/33 on the flooding side and 1/333 on the other side. A drainage of 
0.002m^3⁄s capacity exists along the track at every 40m. 
This shows the importance of the drainage mechanism under the track. In many actual cases 
the railway drainage is blocked or abandoned and cannot be maintained because of short track 
possession time available for planned engineering works especially in urban areas where lines 
are congested. Furthermore, some railway systems have little or no understanding of their 
drainage asset inventory because their railway network is complex in terms of its diversity and 
dispersion.  Also in the past there were examples of an absence drainage in the case study area.  
Figure 9 shows the effect of the drainage capacity at the site when a burst occurs in the same 
case study mentioned above. The results show that discharges greater than 0.04 m^3/s are large 
enough to flood the track regardless of the capacity of the drainage.  
 Figure 9 Time for track flooding for different ballast porosity. The distance between the burst and the lowest 
point is 120m, the gradient of the track is 1/33 on the flooding side and 1/333 on the other side. A drainage of 
0.002m^3⁄s capacity exists along the track at every 40m. 
Last but not least, although the routing and railway gradient are usually the concerns of the 
traction of a railway, the effect of the gradient on the water movement cannot be ignored. Figure 
10 shows the effect of the railway gradient on the time length for track flooding. When the 
railway is almost flat (gradient equals 1/1000) the time for track flooding is significantly longer.  
 
Figure 10 Time for track flooding for different ballast porosity. The distance between the burst and the lowest 
point is 120m. A drainage of 0.002m^3⁄s capacity exists along the track at every 40m. 
Conclusion 
Considering the convergent future challenges such as climate change and demographic 
changes, we can no longer wait until failures reveal the dependencies that exist between 
infrastructures. Different models and tools which look at the effect of interdependencies from 
different viewpoints are necessary for a comprehensive understanding of this topic. However, 
modelling and analysis of complex systems and in particular modelling and analysis of 
infrastructure dependencies have great challenges and the knowledge in this field is still in 
early stage. Hence, in the first place less evident dependencies that may appear as cross-
sectoral risks should be identified by studying past examples and stakeholder engagement. 
Later, considering concerns and motivations of relevant stakeholders, modelling and 
simulation tools should be developed to provide further knowledge about the particular 
dependency.  
This work developed an evaluation tool to facilitate characterisation of a specific dependency 
that exist between two infrastructure systems namely; urban railway and trunk main network 
at operation level. It first identified the general disruption scenario of risk that creates a 
dependency which is not evident while urban systems operate normally. The study later 
quantified such dependency by introducing “time for track flooding due to burst discharge” 
as a metric and carried out a parametric study. The results showed that parameters such as the 
distance between the burst and the lowest point of the track, the gradient of the flooded track, 
the permeability of the ballast and the capacity of the drainage affect the time for track 
flooding and hence the operation of the railway. However, the discharge from trunk mains 
(source of the flood) plays a major role in impacting railway operation.  
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